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Abstract 
The choice between taxes and tradable permits has been independently analysed by two distinct 
research traditions. The first proceeds from Weitzman's partial equilibrium stochastic model and 
concludes that a tax should be preferred if the marginal abatement cost curve is steeper than the 
marginal environmental benefit curve. The second utilises deterministic general equilibrium 
models with pre-existing distortionary taxes. It concludes that non-revenue-raising instruments 
(e.g., grandfathered tradable permits) are costlier than revenue-raising ones (e.g., a tax on every 
unit of pollution or auctioned permits).  
To build a bridge between these two traditions, we introduce in Weitzman's model a positive 
cost of public funds due to pre-existing distortionary taxes. The tax admits a greater comparative 
advantage over the permits, as compared to Weitzman's classical result. Then, we assume that 
the regulated industry blocks any proposal that poses it too high an expected burden. This may 
require a transfer to firms, in the form of freely-allocated permits or lump-sum tax rebate. It 
turns out that if this acceptability constraint is binding, then the comparative advantage of taxes 
over permits is still reinforced. Quantitatively, even if the marginal benefit function is 50% more 
steeply sloped than the marginal cost function, the price instrument should be preferred. 
We also compare the expected net benefit of these two instruments to a contingent instrument 
which leads to the ex post optimum. The superiority of the contingent instrument over the 
quantity one is higher than in first-best. 
Keywords: Environmental taxes, policy choice, tradable permits, second best, uncertainty 
JEL codes: D81; Q25; Q28 
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1. Introduction1 
The formal economic analysis of the choice between taxes and tradable permits for protecting 
the environment dates back to Weitzman (1974)'s seminal paper. In a partial equilibrium 
framework, Weitzman showed that, as long as the abatement cost curve is known with certainty, 
both instruments are equivalent. However, in case of uncertainty on abatement costs, a tax 
should be preferred if and only if the marginal abatement cost curve is steeper than the marginal 
environmental benefit curve. His model has been elaborated in a variety of ways and applied to 
various empirical questions, e.g. climate change (Pizer, 1999). 
Recently, within the "double-dividend" debate, a bulk of papers examined the pros and cons of 
various instruments – including taxes and tradable permits – in a general equilibrium framework 
taking into account pre-existing distortionary taxes
2
. However, because they utilise deterministic 
models, these papers do not take into account Weitzman's results ; taxes and permits differ only 
in that permits are freely (and exogenously) distributed whereas taxes revenues are used to 
reduce existing, distortionary, taxes. In other words, "permits" are modelled as a tax whose 
revenue are transferred lump-sum to regulated firms instead of being used for cutting other 
taxes. By the very definition of a distortionary tax, in these models, "taxes" thus always perform 
better than "permits". In such a setting, auctioned rather than freely distributed permits are 
perfectly equivalent to taxes. 
This view of taxes as being intrinsically revenue-raising, as opposed to permits being either 
auctioned or freely allocated, is widespread. It explains why numerous authors, such as Baumol 
                                                 
1
 I thank two anonymous referees, participants at EAERE and PIREE 2001 conferences, Khalil Helioui and Jean-
Charles Hourcade for useful comments, as well as Institut français de l'énergie for financial support. The usual 
disclaimer applies. 
2
 Cf. Fullerton and Metcalf (2000) and Parry (1997) for analytical models, Goulder et al. (1999a, 1999b) and Parry 
et al. (1999) for analytical and numerical models applied to sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and carbon dioxide 
abatement, respectively. 
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and Oates (1988)
3
 or Jensen and Rasmussen (2000)
4
, stated that freely allocated permits trigger 
less opposition from regulated industries than taxes. Indeed the latter would increase their 
private costs. This issue is of the utmost importance since representatives of regulated industries 
carry significant weight in the political process. Environmental policies that pose serious burden 
on these industries may stand little chance of political survival. As a consequence, permits are 
freely allocated in almost every existing and projected schemes (Boemare and Quirion, 2002). 
Admittedly, non-revenue-raising instruments let more people worse off than revenue-raising 
ones since they are socially less efficient. However, the latter typically poses a relatively high 
burden on a small number of firms whereas the social cost of the former is higher but more 
evenly spread among firms and households. Firms affected by revenue-raising instruments are 
thus more likely to incur the costs of political mobilisation. This is confirmed by various 
empirical studies, e.g. Lévêque ed. (1996), and by "political market" models of instrument 
choice, e.g., Kehoane et al. (1998). Dealing with the opposition to revenue-raising instruments 
from regulated industry is thus of the utmost importance. 
However, such a characterisation of taxes and permits neglects the possibility, put forward in 
particular by Mumy (1980) and Pezzey (1992) of a "charge-subsidy" scheme under which each 
polluting firm pays a charge  
p(Z-ZB) (1) 
to the pollution control authority, where p is the charge or subsidy rate, Z the effluent level and 
ZB is the baseline effluent right which is initially given to each existing firm by the authority. As 
indicated by figure 1, if a firm's effluent is less than its baseline (Z<ZB), it receives a subsidy 
from the authority. Defining such baseline is not more difficult for the authority than choosing 
                                                 
3
 "Although a system of effluent charges will reduce total abatement costs, it will impose a new financial burden, 
the tax bill itself, on polluting firms. […] However, there is an alternative that gets around the problem: A permit 
system can be initiated through a free initial distribution of the permits among current polluters." (pp. 178-9). 
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an amount of freely allocated permits. In practice, both are generally based on past emissions – 
the so-called grandfathering – or on an emission/output ratio applied to past or present 
production – labelled, by respect, benchmarking and output-based allocation5. 
Figure 1. The tax-subsidy scheme 
p 
tax 
subsid y 
ZB  
Z  
 
Pezzey infers that the choice between taxes and permits should be based, not on distributional 
impacts, but on efficiency concerns. In particular it should be based on how well each 
instrument copes with uncertainty, along the line put forward by Weitzman. 
Schöb (1996) first analyses the choice between price and quantity instruments in a world with 
distortionary taxation and concludes that results of Weitzman remain valid. However he utilises 
a modified form of partial equilibrium models by Nichols (1984) and Lee and Misiolek (1986) 
which contradicts recent research on the double dividend. In a brief appendix, we compare his 
model with ours and justify our modelling choice. 
                                                                                                                                                            
4
 "A tradable permits system may in practice be preferred to a uniform tax on CO2, precisely because it entails an 
opportunity to address [concerns such as worker displacement and stranded costs] by means of permits 
disbursements" (pp. 111-2). 
5
 A common characteristic of existing environmental charges is the inclusion of exemptions and tax reliefs, in 
particular for manufacturing industry (Ekins and Speck, 1999). However, those exemptions are generally less 
efficient than the charge-subsidy scheme presented here, in particular because they often charge a lower tax rate on 
some firms. 
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At last, Bovenberg and Goulder (2001, p. 48) state, without demonstrating but referring to the 
above-mentioned paper by Schöb, that "Second-best considerations have no bearing on the 
choice, under uncertainty, between emissions taxes and auctioned quotas, since auctioned 
quotas and emissions taxes are equivalent in terms of their tax-interaction and revenue-recycling 
effects." However, under uncertainty, we will see that auctioned quotas and emissions taxes 
differ in terms of their expected cost, thus also in terms of their expected tax-interaction effect. 
The present paper shows that the choice between a price and a quantity instrument is not 
independent from pre-existing distortions. More precisely, if the cost of the regulation is 
strengthened by pre-existing distortions, the relative advantage of taxes over permits is greater 
than in first-best. Since most theoretical works (especially those cited above) concludes that pre-
existing distortions raise the cost of regulation, we argue that those distortions reinforce the 
rationale for taxes over permits. 
Furthermore, we show that not only Pezzey is right to claim that free permits do not deal with 
adverse impacts on regulated industry better than a charge-subsidy scheme, but that the opposite 
is true. If the authority determines the baseline of the charge-subsidy scheme and the amount of 
permits freely allocated in order to cap the cost for regulated industry, the relative advantage of 
taxes over permits is still higher than in the previous case. 
We also compare the expected net benefit of these two instruments to a "contingent" instrument 
which leads to the ex post optimum. It turns out that the superiority of the contingent instrument 
over the quantity instrument is higher than in first-best. No general result may be derived 
concerning the influence of pre-existing distortions on the superiority of the contingent 
instrument over the price instrument.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. After presenting the model (section 2), we analyse 
three variants in turn. We first consider that the authority can overstep industry pressure and 
thus uses revenue-raising instruments (section 3). We then study non-revenue-raising 
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instruments, i.e., a freely allocated permits system and a charge-subsidy scheme such that the 
expected value of subsidies equals that of charges (section 4). Finally, we consider that the 
regulated industry kills any proposal that poses it an expected burden higher than an exogenous 
level (section 5). The amount transferred as free permits or baseline effluent right of the charge-
subsidy scheme is now chosen by the authority. Last, we provide several arguments indicating 
that for cutting CO2 emissions, a charge-subsidy scheme could be better accepted than a tradable 
permit system, both by industry and environmental groups (section 6). 
 
2. The model 
2.1. Abatement costs and benefits 
Following Weitzman (1974), we use quadratic approximations to measure abatement costs. 
Primary (private)
6
 abatement cost C is perfectly known by the firm, but includes, for the 
authority, a stochastic element  , standardised such that   0E : 
   
22
0 1
,
2
c
C q c c q q      (2) 
where q is the abatement in pollution and  0 0,1, 2ic i   . From (2), 
  1 2, .qC q c c q     (3) 
The environmental benefit function is also taken from Weitzman (1974) except that it is known 
with certainty
7
 : 
 
22
0 1
.
2
b
B q b b q q    (4) 
where  0 0,1, 2ib i   . From (4): 
                                                 
6
 Throughout the paper, we assume that regulated firms are unable to pass the abatement cost on to consumers. 
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 
'
1 2
.B q b b q   (5) 
2.2. Regulator's objective 
In Weitzman's first best framework, the authority maximises expected welfare 
   ,E B q C q    . As shown by Sandmo (1975) and the recent literature on the "double-
dividend", this formula is valid only when lump-sum taxes are available. Otherwise, compared 
to the primary abatement cost, the general equilibrium abatement cost is: 
 increased by the interaction between pre-existing distortionary taxes and the new 
environmental tax (the "tax-interaction effect")
8
; 
 reduced if the revenues raised by the environmental tax or auctioned permits are used to cut 
distortionary taxes (the "revenue-recycling effect"). 
If the latter outweigh the former, the general equilibrium cost of an environmental tax or 
auctioned permit scheme is lower than the private abatement cost. Then a "double-dividend" as 
defined by Parry (1995) is said to occur
9
. This case may hold under certain circumstances, 
especially:  
 if labour taxes are too high, from a "Ramsey" taxation perspective, and if a significant part 
of the environmental tax is paid for by non-wage earners
10
; 
 in case of nominal rigidities in the labour market; 
 if environment quality is a relatively weak substitute for leisure; 
 if the decrease in fossil fuel imports lessens producers' rents; 
                                                                                                                                                            
7
 Benefit uncertainty matters only if correlated with cost uncertainty (Stavins, 1996). 
8
 Intuitively, because of the distortionary nature of the tax, every public good becomes more expensive, including 
the environment. 
9
 If, in addition, the net abatement cost (neglecting the environmental benefit) is negative, there is a "strong double-
dividend" according to Goulder (1995)'s terminology. 
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 if the pro-cyclical nature of energy taxes, compared to labour taxes, is taken into account 
(Helioui, 1997). 
If and only if lump-sum taxes are not available, non-revenue-raising instruments (free permits or 
a charge-subsidy scheme in which the expected total subsidy equals the expected total tax) are 
always costlier than revenue-raising ones. Indeed, the former do not provide the revenue-
recycling effect, nevertheless their cost is raised by the tax-interaction effect. It should be 
stressed that this superiority of revenue-raising instruments over other policies – the "weak 
double-dividend", to follow again Goulder (1995)'s terminology – is uncontroversial. 
With linear demand, supply and marginal cost curves, all goods being equal substitutes for 
leisure, labour being the only production factor and a tax on labour being the only pre-existing 
tax, Goulder et al. (1999b, p. 341) showed that no strong double-dividend occurs and that the 
ratio of the general equilibrium cost of a tax relative to its primary cost equals the marginal cost 
of raising public funds through the pre-existing tax, 1  . We use this result throughout the 
present paper. Graphically, as shown by Parry (1995, fig. 2, lower panel) the marginal general 
equilibrium cost curve of reducing pollution is steeper than without pre-existing distortionary 
taxation. 
On top of this general equilibrium cost of revenue-raising instruments  . ,C q  , a free permit 
or a charge-subsidy scheme entails the cost of the transfer  1 . Bp Z   where ZB is the amount 
of free permits, or the baseline effluent right as in equation (1). This modelling approach was 
used by all macroeconomic deterministic models referred to in footnote 2. 
Hence expected welfare, which is the regulator's objective, now is: 
     . , 1 . BE B q C q p Z        
                                                                                                                                                            
10
 This explains why most general equilibrium analysis applied to European countries exhibit a strong double 
dividend (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2001). 
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where 1   is the marginal excess burden. In this expected welfare function, as in Weitzman's 
original one, the revenue from taxes or auctioned permits is not directly included, since this 
wealth is only transferred from firms to the State. Admittedly, this revenue allows the State to 
reduce pre-existing taxes (revenue-recycling effect), but this is outweighed by the tax-
interaction effect. Furthermore, as shown by the papers referred to in footnote 2, distributing 
grandfathered allowances (or their equivalent as a price instrument, i.e., baseline effluent right) 
leaves the tax-interaction effect unchanged while reducing the revenue raised, hence the 
revenue-recycling effect. This appears in the last part of our objective function. 
3. Optimal instruments when the authority can overstep industry pressure 
3.1. Optimal auctioned permits 
The authority obviously sets ZB=0 and thus chooses q that maximises    . ,E B q C q    . 
The solution ˆ
RR
q  (for revenue-raising) proceeds from the first-order condition: 
   
'
ˆ ˆ' . ,
q
E B q E C q        
hence 1 1
2 2
.
ˆ
.
RR
b c
q
c b





 
The price of the permits equals marginal abatement cost: 
  1 11 2
2 2
.
ˆ ,
.
RR
b c
p q c c
c b

 


  
  
If and only if 1  , we are back to Weitzman's result. When the marginal cost of public funds 
is strictly greater than 1, the optimal quantity and resulting permits price are lower than in first-
best: ˆ ˆ
RR FB
q q  and    ˆ ˆ, ,RR FBp q p q  , where subscripts FB denote Weitzman's first-best 
results. Intuitively, taking into account general equilibrium costs, the authority sets a lower 
abatement target. 
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3.2. Optimal tax on every unit of pollution 
The firm chooses the abatement amount  ,ph  knowing the state of nature  , by equalising 
the marginal abatement cost (3) to the tax p: 
  , ,qC h p p    (6) 
The authority chooses the tax rate 
RR
p  that maximises the expected surplus given this response 
function  ,ph : 
     arg m ax , . , ,
p
p E B h p C h p     
 
  
The first-order condition is: 
         ' , , . , , ,p q pE B h p h p E C h p h p                
which, combined to (6), implies: 
    
 
' , ,
. ,
p
p
E B h p h p
p
E h p
 
 
 
 

  
 

  (7)
 
At this optimal price ex ante corresponds the profit-maximising abatement:  ,h p  . 
By the expression of marginal abatement cost (3) and (6): 
  1
2
,
p c
h p
c


 


  
hence:  
2
1
,
p
h p
c
   
Inserting these two equations into (7): 
1 2 2 1
2 2
. .
.
RR
b c b c
p
c b



  
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hence:  
 
1 2 2 1 1
2 2 2 2
. .
,
.
RR
b c b c c
h p
c b c c



 
 

 . 
3.3. Comparison of price and quantity instruments without transfer 
As in the first-best model, both instruments yield the same optimal expected level of abatement 
and the same optimal expected price/tax: 
  ˆ, 0RR RRE h p q      
 ˆ , 0RR RRE p p q      
The difference between both instruments, in terms of expected environmental benefit and 
primary cost, is the same as in first best: 
    
2
2
2
2
ˆ, 0
2
RR RR
b
E B h p B q
c

    
 
  
where   var2  . 
    
2
2
ˆ, , , 0
2
RR RR
E C h p C q
c

      
 
  
The ex ante optimal tax leads, compared to permits issued in the ex ante optimal quantity, to a 
lower expected environmental benefit and a lower expected abatement cost. These results, valid 
both in first- and second-best are not laid out in Weitzman's article, but they stem directly from 
the author's model. 
The social surplus of the ex ante optimal tax, as compared to the ex ante optimal permit scheme, 
is: 
         
 
2
2 2
2
2
.
ˆ ˆ, . , , . ,
2
RR RR RR RR RR
c b
E B h p C h p E B q C q
c
 
     

         
 
 (8) 
 12 
If and only if 1  , we are back to Weitzman's result. When the marginal cost of public funds 
is strictly greater than 1, the tax admits a greater comparative advantage over the permits, as 
compared to Weitzman's result: 
RR FB
   . 
3.4. Why is the expected abatement cost higher for optimal permits than for optimal taxes? 
The superiority of taxes over permits concerning the expected abatement cost, being of the 
utmost importance for our subsequent results, deserves some more comments. It stems from the 
convexity of the cost function and Jensen's inequality. This inequality states that, for  ,C q   
convex in q,        , ,C E q E E C q     . Combining this last equation with the above 
equality   ˆ,RR RRE h p q     and   0E , we have     ˆ, , 0 ,RR RRC E h p E C q        . 
Figure 2 below provides an illustration with two values of  ,  < 0 and  > 0: 
 
Figure 2. Expected abatement cost for taxes and permits 
 
  ,C q   
  ˆ ,E C q     
 
   , , 0C E h p     
 q 
  ,h p     ˆ,E h p q      ,h p   
 
Intuitively, the tax gives firms more flexibility by letting them choose their abatement level: if 
the cost is higher than expected by the regulator, they will benefit from abating less and paying 
more tax, compared to the quantity solution. On the contrary, if the cost is lower than expected 
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by the regulator, they will benefit from abating more and paying less tax. Note that with a 
concave benefit function this flexibility is harmful to the environment, hence a symmetrical 
reasoning can be made for benefits. 
3.5. Contingent revenue-raising instrument 
The instruments studied until now only exceptionally lead to the ex post optimum. The latter 
may be obtained if the regulator is able to use an "ideal" or "contingent" instrument, i.e., which 
depends on the state of nature realised, as shown by Ireland (1977). Various implementations of 
such a system have been proposed. In our simplified model, since there is no uncertainty on the 
benefits curve, several instruments may under certain assumptions be able to reach or 
approximate the ex post optimum: a non-linear tax; a set of various kinds of allowances, each 
being combined with a tax acting as a price cap and a subsidy acting as a price floor (Roberts 
and Spence, 1976); open market operations by the regulator to adjust the number of permits 
(Collinge and Oates, 1980); or a menu of call options for buying additional permits (Unold and 
Requate, 2001).  
Nevertheless, all these implementations have potential drawbacks and involve additional 
complexity, as already stressed in Weitzman's original article (1974, p. 481). As a consequence, 
"single-value instruments", i.e., linear taxes and tradable permit schemes, are more and more 
common in environmental policy
11
 and are still worth studying. However, it is interesting to 
know whether the expected advantage of the contingent instrument is worth the additional 
complexity. 
With our cost and benefit functions, the abatement resulting from the contingent instrument is 
computed by maximizing ex post welfare: 
 1 1*
2 2
.
RR
b c
q
c b
 

 


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If 1  , we are back to Ireland (1977)'s result. Otherwise, the optimal abatement is lower. The 
advantage of the contingent instrument over the quantity one is: 
       
 
2 2
* *
2 2
ˆ ˆ( , ) . , . ,
2
RR RR RR RR RR RR
CI Q E B q C q E B q C q
c b
 
               
This expression is (obviously) positive and (which is more interesting) increased by pre-existing 
distortions ( 1  ). The advantage of the contingent instrument over the price instrument is: 
         
 
2 2
* * 2
2
2 2 2
( , ) . , , . , ,
2 .
RR RR RR RR RR RR
b
CI P E B q C q E B h p C h p
c c b

     

        
  

 
 
which is also positive, but reduced by pre-existing distortions.  
The distortionary nature of the pre-existing tax system thus reinforces the case for a contingent 
instrument as compared to a quantity instrument, but weakens the case for such an instrument as 
an alternative to a price one. 
 
4. Optimal non-revenue-raising instruments  
When all permits are freely allocated or when the baseline of the charge-subsidy scheme is such 
that the expected value of subsidies equals that of charges, the authority sets  0BZ Z E q  , 
where Z0 is the initial effluent level. Thus it maximises: 
       0. , 1E B q C q p Z q        . 
4.1. Optimal scheme of freely allocated permits 
The solution ˆ
RN
q  (for revenue-neutral) proceeds from the first-order condition: 
           0ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ' . , 1 , , ,q q qB q E C q E p q Z p q p q q                 
                                                                                                                                                            
11
 Cf. Boemare and Quirion (2002) and Tietenberg (2002) on tradable permits, and Ekins (1999) on taxes. 
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By the expression of marginal abatement cost (3), marginal environmental benefit (5) and (6): 
 
 
1 2 0 1
2 2
1 .
ˆ
2
RN
b c Z c
q
b c


  

 
 
The price of the permits equals marginal abatement cost: 
 
 
 
1 2 0 1
1 2
2 2
1 .
ˆ ,
2
RN
b c Z c
p q c c
b c

 

  
  
   
As in the previous case, we are back to Weitzman's results if 1  . For all reasonable values of 
 , i.e.,  1, 2  , the optimal quantity and resulting permits price are lower than in first-best: 
ˆ ˆ
RN FB
q q  and    ˆ ˆ, ,RN FBp q p q  . 
4.2. Optimal ex ante non-revenue-raising charge-subsidy scheme 
The authority chooses the tax rate 
R N
p  that maximises the expected surplus given the response 
function  ,ph : 
          0arg m ax , . , , 1 ,
p
p E B h p C h p p Z h p          
 
      
The first-order condition is: 
                0' , , . , , , 1 , ,p q p pE B h p h p E C h p h p Z h p h p p                          
which yields: 
    
 
2 1 2 1 1 2 0
2 2
. . 1
2
RN
b c c b c c Z
p
b c


   

 
  
hence:  
 
 
1 1 2 2 0
0
2 2 2 2
,
RN
b c b c Z
h p Z
c b c c



  
  
 
 . 
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4.3. Comparison of non-revenue-raising price and quantity instruments 
Once again, both instruments yield the same optimal expected level of abatement and the same 
optimal expected permits price/rate of tax and subsidy: 
  ˆ, 0RN RNE h p q      
 ˆ , 0RN RNE p p q      
The difference between both instruments in terms of expected environmental benefit and 
primary cost, is once again the same: 
    
2
2
2
2
ˆ, 0
2
RN RN
b
E B h p B q
c

    
 
  
    
2
2
ˆ, , , 0
2
RN RN
E C h p C q
c

      
 
  
The social surplus of the ex ante optimal tax, as compared to the ex ante optimal permit scheme, 
is: 
          
         
 
0
2
2 2
0 2
2
, . , , 1 ,
.
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ. , 1 ,
2
RN RN RN RN RN
RN RN RN RN
E B h p C h p Z h p p
c b
E B q C q Z q p q
c
     
 
   
      
 

       
   
 (8') 
Comparing (8') with (8), we see that the comparative advantage of the price instrument over the 
quantity one is the same with revenue-raising or non-revenue-raising-instruments: 
RN RR FB
     . This can be explained by the equality between the expected value of free 
permits and the baseline effluent right. This is not surprising since the expected price/tax and 
subsidy rate and the expected abatement level are the same for both instruments. 
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4.4. Contingent non-revenue-raising instrument 
The abatement resulting from the contingent instrument is again computed by maximizing 
welfare: 
 
 
1 1 2 0*
2 2
. 1
2
RN
b c c Z
q
b c
 

   

 
 
If 1  , we are back again to Ireland's result. Otherwise, the optimal abatement may be lower 
or higher. The advantage of the contingent instrument over the quantity one is: 
         
         
  
* * * *
0
2
0
2 2
( , ) . , 1 ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ. , 1 ,
2 2
RN RN RN RN RN RN
RN RN RN RN
C I Q E B q C q Z q p q
E B q C q Z q p q
b c
   

   

      
 
       
 
 
This expression is positive and increased by pre-existing distortions. The advantage of the 
contingent price instrument over the standard price instrument is: 
         
          
  
  
* * * *
0
2
2
2 2
0 2
2 2 2
( , ) . , 1 ,
1
, . , , 1 ,
2 2
RN RN RN RN RN RN
RN RN RN RN
C I P E B q C q Z q p q
b c
E B h p C h p Z h p p
c b c
   
 
     

      
 
 
      
 
 
   
 
which is also positive and may be increased or decreased by pre-existing distortions, depending 
on the parameters. 
 
5. Optimal acceptable instruments 
There is no a priori rationale for allocating all permits in a free manner, nor for setting the 
baseline effluent right of a charge-subsidy scheme such that it does not provide any public 
revenue. For instance, as Bovenberg and Goulder (2000), Burtraw et al. (2001) or Jensen and 
Rasmussen (2000) have shown, for greenhouse gases abatement, freely allocated upstream 
permits are likely to overcompensate the fossil fuel industry. In these simulations, profits in 
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regulated sectors rise following the limitation of pollution, because firms pass a significant part 
of the permits' cost on to consumers, while they receive permits for free. In such a situation, it 
makes sense for the authority to grandfather only a part of the permits and auction the rest, thus 
providing some public revenues without cutting the profits of the regulated industry. 
Thus, in this section, we consider that the regulated industry kills any proposal that poses it an 
expected burden
12
 higher than an exogenous level M. The rationale for such an assumption is 
that for regulated industry, political mobilisation is costly, and worthless if the expected burden 
of the regulation is small. The authority now faces an acceptability constraint: 
   0, BE C q E p Z q Z M           . 
This is equivalent to      0. ,BE p Z E C q p Z q M      . Two cases may thus occur:  
If the acceptability constraint is not binding, e.g. because abatement is cheap or because M is 
high, the authority sets ZB=0 and maximises    . ,E B q C q    . If not we are back to the 
situation dealt with in section 3. 
On the opposite, if the acceptability constraint is binding, the authority chooses the minimum 
amount for ZB that satisfies the constraint. It thus maximises 
          0. , 1 ,E B q C q C q p Z q M           . In the rest of this fifth section we 
derive results for this second case, i.e., assuming that the acceptability constraint is binding. 
5.1. Optimal permit scheme with a mix of free allocation and auctioning 
The solution ˆ
PRR
q  (for partly revenue-raising) proceeds from the first-order condition: 
             ˆ ˆ0ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ' 2 1 , 1 , , ,q q qB q E C q E p q Z p q p q q                  
                                                 
12
 One could argue that firms are interested in the actual, not expected, burden they will face. However, as stressed, 
e.g., by Kehoane et al. (1998) or Lévêque ed. (1996), most firms are involved in lobbying through organised 
interest groups. Would a single firm disclose its private abatement costs to such a lobbying group, it would give 
away some strategic information to its competitors. 
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By the expression of marginal abatement cost (3), marginal environmental benefit (5) and (6): 
 1 1 2 0
2 2
. 1 .
ˆ
PRR
b c c Z
q
b c
   


 
The price of the permits equals marginal abatement cost: 
 
 1 1 2 0
1 2
2 2
. 1 .
ˆ ,
PRR
b c c Z
p q c c
b c
 
 
  
  

. 
As in the two previous cases, we are back to Weitzman's results if 1  . For 1  , 
ˆ ˆ ˆ
PRR RR FB
q q q   and      ˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,PRR RR FBp q p q p q    . When the mix of free and auctioned 
permits is chosen by the regulator in order to overcome industry opposition, every increase in 
pollution abatement implies a bigger transfer in the form of free permits. Hence, the authority 
sets a lower target, compared to the situation without transfer. However, no general comparison 
can be made between ˆ
PRR
q  and ˆ
RN
q , nor between ˆ
RN
q  and ˆ
RR
q . Indeed, when all the permits are 
freely allocated, an increase in pollution abatement decreases the number of permits transferred, 
which provides an incentive for the authority to set a tougher target. On the other hand, 
however, this increase in abatement raises the permits price and thus the cost of the transfer, 
hence the overall result depends on the parameters. 
5.2. Optimal charge-subsidy scheme with a baseline effluent right below expected 
emissions 
The authority chooses the tax rate 
PRR
p  that maximises the expected surplus given the response 
function  ,ph : 
              0arg max , . , , 1 , , ,
p
p E B h p C h p C h p p Z h p M              
 
       
The first-order condition is: 
                  0' , , 2 1 , , , 1 , ,p q p pE B h p h p E C h p h p Z h p h p p                           
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which yields: 
    2 1 2 1 1 2 0
2 2
. . 1
PRR
b c c b c c Z
p
b c
   


  
hence:  
  
 
1 2 2 2 2 0 1
2 2 2
. . . 1 .
,
PRR
b c b c c Z c
h p
c b c
   

    


 . 
5.3. Comparison of "partly revenue raising" price and quantity instruments 
Once again, both instruments yield the same optimal expected level of abatement and the same 
optimal expected price/tax: 
  ˆ, 0PRR PRRE h p q      
 ˆ , 0PRR PRRE p p q      
The difference between both instruments, in terms of expected environmental benefit and 
primary cost, is once again the same: 
    
2
2
2
2
ˆ, 0
2
PRR PRR
b
E B h p B q
c

    
 
  (9) 
    
2
2
ˆ, , , 0
2
PRR PRR
E C h p C q
c

      
 

 (10) 
The difference between both instruments, in terms of expected transfer, is: 
           
2
0 0
2
ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , , , 0
2
PRR PRR PRR PRR PRR PRR
E C h p Z h p p M C q Z q p q M
c

              
 
  
 
The expected burden of the regulation (excluding the transfer) is higher for permits than for 
taxes (cf. (10) and the explanation above, paragraph 3.4). As a consequence, the authority has to 
transfer a higher financial amount under the form of free permits rather than as baseline effluent 
right of the charge-subsidy scheme. 
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The social surplus of the ex ante optimal tax, as compared to the ex ante optimal permit scheme, 
is: 
     
        
            
  
0
0
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2 2
2
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, . , ,
1 , , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ. , 1 , ,
2 1
2
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PRR PRR PRR PRR PRR
B h p C h p
E
C h p Z h p M p
E B q C q C q Z q M p q
c b
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   
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    
 
 
  
     
 
       
 
 

 
  
 (8'') 
Comparing (8'') with (8') and (8), we notice that the comparative advantage of price instruments 
over quantity ones is greater than with an exogenous (positive as in section 4, or nil as in section 
3) quantity of free permits or baseline effluent right: 
PRR RR RN FB
       . 
Quantitatively, this result should not be considered trivial. Goulder et al. (1999b)'s estimate of 
the   parameter is 1.27. This means that even if the marginal benefit function is 50% more 
steeply sloped than the marginal cost function (normally arguing for a quantity instrument), the 
price instrument should be preferred. 
5.4. Contingent "partly revenue raising" instrument 
The abatement resulting from the contingent instrument is again computed by maximizing 
welfare: 
 1 2 0 1 2 0*
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. .
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    
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
 
If 1  , we are back again to Ireland's result. Otherwise, the optimal abatement is lower. The 
advantage of the contingent instrument over the quantity one is:  
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This expression is positive and increased by pre-existing distortions. The advantage of the 
contingent price instrument over the standard price instrument is:  
         
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which is also positive and may be increased or decreased by pre-existing distortions, depending 
on the parameters. 
 
6. Reducing CO2 emissions from energy-intensive industry: an appropriate 
context for applying a charge-subsidy scheme 
From the late eighties to the late nineties, there was a broad consensus, among economists and 
policy-makers willing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, in favour of a carbon tax. Since then, 
tradable permits have received a growing attention, and a number of OECD countries as well as 
the European Union (Boemare and Quirion, 2002) are planning or developing such systems. 
Among the factors that can explain this switch is the opposition of industry lobby groups to 
taxes, which led to the rejection of the energy and carbon tax proposals in the European Union 
and the U.S. in the early and mid nineties, and the relative preference of these lobby groups for 
(freely allocated) permits (NHO, 2001)
13
. However, in the light of our analysis, this preference 
largely stems from the oversight of a charge-subsidy scheme, which combines two advantages, 
from the industry point of view: like grandfathered permits, it may only charge marginal 
emissions, and like a tax, it provides some flexibility concerning the overall abatement. 
                                                 
13
 Among other factors are, first, the success of the U.S. SO2 tradable permits scheme and, second, the Kyoto 
Protocol to the UN Convention on climate change, which sets tradable permits among developed countries. 
However, none of them is a rigorous rationale for preferring a quantity to a price instrument in this field. First, 
some countries, in particular Sweden, have succeeded in cutting SO2 emissions through a tax system (Hammar and 
Löfgren, 2000). Second, the Protocol does not require signatory parties to subject their firms to tradable permits. 
Nothing prevents them from fulfilling their obligations through a tax or a combination of various policies and 
measures. 
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Furthermore, throughout the paper we have assumed that firms are risk-neutral. However, there 
are several reasons for why firms may act as if they were risk-averse
14
. In such a case, the 
comparative advantage of taxes over permits would be still higher for regulated firms, since 
taxes entail less uncertainty on abatement costs than permits. 
Admittedly, environmental lobbying groups, in particular administrations in charge of the 
environment, environmental NGOs and green political parties, obviously prefer an instrument 
that provides certainty on the environmental objective. This is true if these groups are risk-
neutral, as soon as the environmental benefit curve is concave. Furthermore, the above argument 
on risk-aversion is particularly important for groups that generally advocate the precautionary 
principle. 
Nevertheless, do tradable permits provide environmental certainty in the particular field of 
climate change? Of course, one can design such a system
15
, but the bulk of current proposals, 
including the European Commission directive proposal (2001) do not provide much more 
environmental certainty than taxes. First, they aim at regulating emissions downstream, at the 
fossil fuel consumer level, not upstream, at the level of fossil fuel producers and importers. As a 
consequence, they fail to regulate diffuse sources, in particular transportation and buildings, 
which are the more rapidly growing sector, and the ones for which uncertainty concerning future 
emissions is the highest. Second, these proposals often advocate exchangeability between the 
domestic permits they would create and the international permits of the Kyoto Protocol
16
. The 
Bonn and Marrakech agreements which finalise the Protocol incorporate most of the 
"loopholes" environmental NGOs have been fighting against for years: credits for business-as-
                                                 
14
 Some of the factors that can be invoked are non-diversified owners, liquidity constraints, costly financial distress, 
and non-linear tax systems. And even if owners themselves wish to maximise expected profits, delegation of 
control to a risk-averse manager, whose payment is linked to firm performance, may cause the firm to behave in a 
risk-averse manner. Empirically, the reluctance to bear risk is evidenced by the extent of corporate hedging activity 
(Asplund, 1999). 
15
 See in particular Kopp et al. (1999)'s proposal for the U.S. 
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usual activities, for nuclear projects, for environmentally damaging tree plantations 
(Greenpeace, 2000)... Both points are heavily criticised by environmental NGOs
17
, who would 
predominantly prefer a price instrument, provided that it is comprehensive and not opened to 
dubious international credits. 
Last, on a more ideological level, most environmental NGOs and green parties traditionally 
prefer taxes to tradable permits, often denounced as "rights to pollute". The U.S. NGO 
Environmental Defense is an exception in this respect. 
Thus, political acceptability considerations add up with economic efficiency considerations
18
 to 
favour a price rather than a quantity instrument against CO2 emissions. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Introducing pre-existing distortionary taxes in Weitzman's (1974) stochastic framework 
provides new insights on the comparative advantage of taxes over permits. First, this 
comparative advantage is greater in second- than in first-best conditions. This conclusion holds 
for revenue-raising instruments, i.e., auctioned permits vs. a tax on every unit of pollution, as 
well as for non-revenue-raising instruments, i.e., freely allocated permits vs. a charge-subsidy 
scheme such that the expected amount of subsidies equals that of charges. 
There is no a priori rationale for allocating all permits in a free manner, nor for setting the 
baseline effluent right of a charge-subsidy scheme such that it does not provide any public 
revenue. It is more consistent to assume that the regulated industry kills any proposal that poses 
                                                                                                                                                            
16
 The European Commission directive proposal (2001) does not decide on this point which will be addressed by 
another directive proposal, currently prepared by the Commission. 
17
 See the reaction from Climate Action Network Europe (2001) to the European Commission proposal. CAN-E is 
the coordinating office for environmental groups in Western Europe working on climate change issues. 
18
 Most economists, e.g. Hourcade (1994) or Pizer (1999), argue that taxes would perform better than quotas to 
fight against global warming, because greenhouse gases are a stock pollutant, so the short-term damage curve is 
flat. 
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it too high an expected burden, and that the authority takes this constraint into account to set the 
transferred amount. In such a setting, and this is our second important result, permits require a 
greater transfer. As a consequence, the comparative advantage of taxes over permits is still 
reinforced when the amount transferred to regulated firms is chosen by the regulator so as to 
overcome industry pressure. 
We also compare the expected net benefit of these two instruments to a "contingent" instrument 
which leads to the ex post optimum. Such instruments have potential drawbacks and involve 
additional complexity. This explains why "single-value instruments", i.e., linear taxes and 
tradable permit schemes, are more and more common in environmental policy and why they are 
still worth studying. However, knowing the expected advantage of a hypothetical contingent 
instrument over the single-value ones is interesting to decide whether the theoretical advantage 
of the contingent instrument is worth the additional complexity. It turns out that the superiority 
of the contingent instrument over the quantity instrument is higher than in first-best. No general 
result may be derived concerning the influence of pre-existing distortions on the superiority of 
the contingent instrument over the price instrument. 
This article aims at providing analytical rather than quantitative results. However, a preliminary 
analysis shows that our findings should not be considered quantitatively trivial. Taking an 
estimate of the marginal cost of public funds from the literature, even if the marginal benefit 
function is 50% more steeply sloped than the marginal cost function (normally arguing for a 
quantity instrument), the price instrument should be preferred if the amount transferred is firms 
is set so as to overcome industry pressure. 
Last, we provide several arguments indicating that in the case of climate change, a charge-
subsidy scheme could be better accepted than a tradable permit system, both by industry and 
environmental groups.  
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Hence, in the future, we would like to integrate this paper's considerations in a numerical 
general equilibrium model applied to climate change. This integration would also let us know 
whether our results would remain in a more complex model, in particular one exhibiting a 
"strong double dividend" along one of the lines presented in the second paragraph. 
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Appendix 
Schöb (1996) wrote the first paper on the comparison of price and quantity instruments in a 
second-best world with distortionary taxation. He concludes that the first-best choice rule 
demonstrated by Weitzman (1974) remains valid in second-best. However, his paper is based on 
a partial equilibrium model inspired by Lee and Misiolek (1986) which, as we argue here, is not 
consistent with the more recent general equilibrium literature on the double-dividend 
summarised e.g. by Goulder (1994) or Bovenberg and Goulder (2001). In the language 
introduced by Parry (1995), Schöb's model reflects the revenue-recycling effect but not the tax-
interaction effect. Too see why, let us restate the welfare function Schöb (1996, p. 403, equation 
1) assumes that the government maximises: 
   . . .W B x q x e x t x     (A.1) 
Where x is the consumption of a polluting good, B the gross private benefit from this 
consumption, q the marginal private production cost, assumed constant, e the environmental 
damage,   the marginal excess burden, and t the environmental tax rate, t.x being the 
environmental tax revenue. Rewriting (A.1) with our notations, we got: 
       01 BW B q C q p Z q Z       (A.2) 
There are two differences with our own objective function:   does not appear before C and the 
revenue from a tax or auctioned permits now appears positively in the welfare function. To see 
which formulation is the most appropriate, let us focus on the influence of a shift from first-best 
to second-best, or more generally of an increase in the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF). 
From equation (A.2), Schöb (1996, p. 404, equation. 4) derives the optimal tax rate t*: 
*
1
1 1
M ED
t



 
  
 
 (A.3) 
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Where   is the tax elasticity
19
. We see that in Schöb's formulation, following a rise in the 
marginal cost of public funds, a higher environmental tax should be set if and only if we are on 
the Laffer-efficient side of the tax revenue curve, i.e. if the tax elasticity is smaller than one. 
This is consistent with the earlier partial equilibrium models which founded the strong version 
of the double dividend hypothesis but clearly contradicts the conclusions of the more recent 
general equilibrium work summarised e.g. by Goulder (1994). According to this literature, as 
soon as the MCPF exceeds unity, a lower tax rate than in first-best should be set. More 
precisely, quoting Goulder (1994, p. 27),  
"From Bovenberg and van der Ploeg's analysis, in a second-best setting the optimal 
environmental tax rate, t*, is given by:  
*
M ED
t

  (A.4) 
where   is the marginal cost of public funds." 
Bovenberg and Goulder (2001, p. 8) also conclude that  
"the higher the MCPF, the smaller the optimal environmental tax, ceteris paribus."  
In their model, moving from first- to second-best, the optimal tax rate is divided by the MCPF: 
compare equations (16) and (23) in their paper.  
As pointed out by Goulder (1994, footnote 56), results by Lee and Misiolek are consistent with 
the Bovenberg and van der Ploeg formula only if the fact that pre-existing taxes increase the 
marginal abatement cost is taken into account. This is not the case in the paper by Schöb (1986), 
as is clear from equation (A.1) above. On the opposite, our optimal tax formula from 3.2 is 
                                                 
19
 The tax elasticity indicates the percentage at which the demand for the polluting good will be reduced if the tax 
rate is increased by 1%. 
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compatible with Bovenberg and van der Ploeg's formulae: taking a constant MED, i.e., b2=0 in 
our model, the optimal tax is 1
RR
b M ED
p
 
  . 
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